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Abstract—Cloud computing has greatly facilitated large-scale
data outsourcing due to its cost efficiency, scalability and many
other advantages. Subsequent privacy risks force data owners
to encrypt sensitive data, hence making the outsourced data no
longer searchable. Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) is
an advanced cryptographic primitive addressing the above issue,
which maintains efficient keyword search over encrypted data
without disclosing much information to the storage provider.
Existing SSE schemes implicitly assume that original user data
is centralized, so that a searchable index can be built at once.
Nevertheless, especially in cloud computing applications, user-side
data centralization is not reasonable, e.g. an enterprise distributes
its data in several data centers. In this paper, we propose the
notion of Multi-Data-Source SSE (MDS-SSE), which allows each
data source to build a local index individually and enables the
storage provider to merge all local indexes into a global index
afterwards. We propose a novel MDS-SSE scheme, in which an
adversary only learns the number of data sources, the number
of entire data files, the access pattern and the search pattern, but
not any other distribution information such as how data files or
search results are distributed over data sources. We offer rigorous
security proof of our scheme, and report experimental results to
demonstrate the efficiency of our scheme.
Keywords—Searchable Symmetric Encryption, Multiple Data
Sources, Data Outsourcing, Cloud Computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the most successful cloud computing techniques,
cloud storage offers elastic storage services within a “pay-as-
you-go” mode. More and more cloud users outsource their
data to cloud storage providers such as Dropbox and iCloud
to diminish the cost of data storage and management. However,
security and privacy risks are still the most concern in practical
cloud storage usage [1], as cloud users will lose the physical
control over their data. Encrypting data before outsourcing is
an effective way to guarantee data confidentiality. As a result,
electronic health records (ERHs) are legislatively required to
be encrypted in several countries [16]
A new challenge comes that encrypted data is not search-
able, which will severely influence the retrievability of the data.
To address this issue, an advanced cryptographic primitive has
been proposed, commonly known as Searchable Symmetric
Encryption (SSE). SSE allows a storage provider to answer
keyword search queries on encrypted data without learning
much information about the data as well as searched keywords.
Most SSE schemes [7], [13], [12], [11], [4], [19], [17], [3]
require a data owner to build a secure searchable index at
a setup phase, so that subsequent keyword searches can be
executed in an efficient way.
As far as we know, existing SSE schemes implicitly assume
that the searchable index can be directly built by a certain user.
This assumption only makes sense when user data is extremely
light weight and stored centrally, which is however inconsistent
with many cloud computing scenarios. Consider a data owner,
whose data is separately stored in several data centers. It is
not possible for such data owner to centralize all the data and
build a searchable index at once. Personal social data such
as chatting records, light weight though, are often stored in
several different devices (laptop, ipad, mobile phone). It is
not reasonable to require the user to move all data into one
device. Moreover, previous SSE schemes are not suitable for
data sharing scenarios, for instance that a number of hospitals
need to share ERHs. Therefore, it is apparent that we need
SSE schemes with support for multiple data sources, which
we call Multi-Data-Source SSE (MDS-SSE).
Suppose there are k data sources. A naive approach is
that each data source uses any previous SSE scheme to build
his/her own searchable index and uploads it to the server. To
perform a search, the server needs to search in k indexes
respectively. The drawbacks of this approach are two-fold: (1)
Much information is leaked as the server learns how data files
and search results are distributed over k data sources. Such
non-trivial information leakage might lead to severe privacy
compromise (e.g., by statistical attacks). (2) There are at least
k index searches no matter how many search results will be
found.
To hide data file distribution, one should break the correla-
tion between data files and data sources, which means data files
should be anonymously transported to the server. This can be
achieved using anonymous communication techniques such as
Onion Routing [10]. To hide search result distribution, indexes
built by each data source should be indistinguishable to each
other. It implicitly requires that indexes can be merged at the
server side (otherwise the server can search in each index and
disclose search result distribution).
We observe that dynamic searchable symmetric encryption
(DSSE) schemes [13], [12], [19], [17], [3] can be used in
the following way to build only one index rather than k
indexes: one data source firstly builds its own searchable
index and uploads it to the server while other data sources
subsequently append their data using the Update algorithm
in DSSE. Nevertheless, this approach still leaks search result
distribution because the server is able to identify which results
are for the initial index and which are for the updated ones.
Moreover, this approach will lead to either more additional
leakage [13], [17], or larger data structures [12], or higher
computation/communication overheads [19], [3].
We also observe that the basic scheme in [3] can be ex-
tended to a secure MDS-SSE scheme (see details in Appendix
A). However, the resultant scheme requires data sources to
maintain an online table during index building. On one hand, it
is not always easy to make every data source have access to the
online table. On the other hand, the usage of the online table
has potential risks in real-world systems, e.g., by observing
how many times a data source touches the table an adversary
can learn the number of keywords for this data source.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address
the MDS-SSE issue and formally define the notion of
MDS-SSE.
• We propose a novel MDS-SSE scheme which is efficient
in terms of index size and search time. Our scheme
is proven to be secure against adaptive chosen-keyword
attacks (CKA2) in the standard model.
• We have implemented our scheme and the scheme in
[3]. Experimental results on different types of datasets
demonstrate the efficiency of our scheme.
II. RELATED WORK
Searching on remote encrypted data can achieve optimal
security guarantee (i.e., nothing is leaked) by using Oblivious
Random Access Memory (ORAM) [9]. Though recent works
[20], [21] make ORAM much more practical, ORAM remains
unacceptable for large scale data outsourcing applications. To
maintain practical search, several early SSE works [18], [8],
[5], [7] tried to find a proper tradeoff between efficiency and
security. Curtmola et al. [7] proposed sound security models
for SSE, which called non-adaptive/adaptive1 (CKA1/CKA2)
security. Chase and Kamara [6] further generalized the security
models by using leakage functions to parameterize information
leakage.
Under CKA1 or CKA2 security model, a series of effi-
cient SSE schemes [7], [6], [13], [12], [19], [17], [3] have
been proposed. Their common idea is to build an searchable
index before data outsourcing. Each entry in the index is
a keyword/identifier pair. Given a keyword, all identifiers
whose corresponding data files containing the keyword can
be efficiently searched out. In [7], keyword/identifier pairs are
organized as linked lists and stored in an array. The authors
constructed a look-up table to locate the head node for each
linked list. This scheme is proved to be CKA1-secure and
achieves optimal search time complexity that only linearly
scale with the number of search results. The authors also gave
a CKA2-secure scheme which requires much larger index and
higher communication overhead. Subsequent SSE schemes use
different index structures to extend the functionality of SSE:
More Data Types and Query Types. In [6], Chase and
Kamara considered looked-up queries on matrix data, search
1The adaptiveness depends on whether the adversary can generate query
depend on previous answers and the index.
Fig. 1. The system model of MDS-SSE: an illustration
queires on labeled data, neighbor and adjacency queries on
graph data, and subgraph queries on labeled graph data. Jin Li
et al. considered fuzzy keyword search queries in [15]. Cash et
al. proposed a SSE scheme supporting multi-keyword boolean
search in [4].
Dynamic Updates. Dynamic SSE (DSSE) schemes were
proposed in [13], [19], [17], [3], which support data dynamic
updates. The schemes in [13] and [3] use additional data
structures to manage newly added data or deleted data. The
scheme in [19] achieves smallest leakage during updates, but
requires poly-logarithmic overhead on top of the overhead of
[13] and [3]. In [17], the authors present a novel data structure
called Blind Storage, which requires more storage space (four
times size of original data) but makes the server computation
free.
Parallel Search. Parallel search was considered in [12]
and [3]. The scheme in [12] uses tree-based index to achieve
O((r/p) log n) parallel search time while the scheme in [3]
uses dictionary-based index to achieve O(r/p) parallel search
time, where r stands for the number of search results and p
stands for the number of processors.
Multiple Users. The notion of Multi-user SSE (MSSE) was
first proposed in [7]. Using MSSE a data owner can authorize
the search ability for arbitrary subset of multiple data users.
We can see that MSSE and MDS-SSE are two different notions
because the former supports multiple data users while the latter
supports multiple data owners.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce the system model and
adversary model of MDS-SSE and then give formal definitions
of a typical MDS-SSE scheme and its security model. At last,
we introduce several tools and data structures we will use in
our construction.
System Model. There are three roles in a MDS-SSE system:
(1) k data sources, denoted as DS = {DS1, ...,DSk}, who
own k collections of data files. (2) Data users, denoted as
DU, who issue search queries for interested keywords. (3)
Storage provider, denoted as SP, who stores encrypted user
data files and responses DU’s search queries. Note that DU
can be DS themselves, or any authorized users who share
the secret key with DS. As illustrated in Fig. 1, DS encrypt
data files and build searchable indexes before data oursourcing.
Upon receiving k indexes from DS, SP merges them. DU use
secret key to issue search tokens and afterwards SP searches
the index and returns the identifiers of data files containing
searched keywords.
Adversary Model. We treat untrusted SP as the adversary,
who behaves “honest-but-curious”. On one hand, the adversary
follows all the operations required by the MDS-SSE system
model. On the other hand, SP tries to deduce private informa-
tion about the original data or searched keywords.
MDS-SSE and Security Definition. The following defines a
typical MDS-SSE scheme. One can properly extend algorith-
m’s input or output in specific constructions.
Definition 1 (MDS-SSE): A Multi-Data-Source Searchable
Symmetric Encryption (MDS-SSE) scheme is a collection of
five algorithms (KeyGen, BuildIndex, MergeIndex, Token-
Gen, Search) and two protocols (Setup, Query), defined as:
• K ←KeyGen(1λ): takes as input a security parameter λ
and outputs a secret key K .
• Isid ←BuildIndex(K,D, sid): takes as input a secret key
K , a collection of data files D and an identity of a data
source sid. It outputs a secure searchable index Isid. The
sid can simply be integers so that we denote 1, ..., k as
the sid for k data sources respectively.
• I ←MergeIndex({Isid}1≤sid≤k): takes as input k index-
es generated from k data sources. It outputs a merged
secure searchable index I .
• τw ←TokenGen(K,w): takes as input a secret key K
and a search word w. It outputs a search token τw.
• ID(w) ←Search(τw, I): takes as input a search token
τw and an index I . It outputs ID(w), a collection of
identifiers whose corresponding data files containing the
search word w.
- Setup: is performed by DS and SP. During the setup
protocol, DS generate and share a secret key, and then
prepare all information needed to build indexes. Finally
DS outsource encrypted data files and secure searchable
indexes while SP stores all the data and merges all
indexes.
- Query: is performed by DU and SP. During the query
protocol, DU send search tokens to SP and the latter
returns search results.
To attain efficiency, most SSE schemes leak the access
pattern and the search pattern to the adversary, which are
defined as:
Definition 2 (Access Pattern): Let w = w1, ..., wn be a
sequence of n searched keywords and ID(w1), ..., ID(wn)
be their corresponding search results. The access pattern over
w is a tuple ϕw = (ID(w1), ..., ID(wn))
Definition 3 (Search Pattern): Let w = w1, ..., wn be a
sequence of n searched keywords. The search pattern over w
is an n × n matrix ρw where ρw[i][j] = 1 if wi = wj and
ρw[i][j] = 0 otherwise (1 ≤ i, j ≤ n).
We follow the “state-of-the-art” SSE security model in [7],
[6] while making slight modifications to fit the multi-data-
source scenario. The security model is parametrized by leakage
functions Lsetup and Lquery that indicating information leak-
age during Setup and Query protocols. Our scheme achieves
CKA2 security, which guarantees that nothing is leaked more
than the output of Lsetup and Lquery even if the adversary
has the ability to perform adaptive chosen-keyword attacks in
probability polynomial time (PPT). We give simulation-based
definitions as follows:
Definition 4 (CKA2-security): Let Π = (KeyGen, BuildIn-
dex, MergeIndex, TokenGen, Search, Setup, Query) be an
MDS-SSE scheme and Lsetup,Lquery be leakage functions.
Let k be the number of data sources. For an adversary A and
a simulator S, we define the following experiments:
• RealA(λ): the challenger generates a secret key K =
KeyGen(1λ). A chooses k collections of data files
D1, ...,Dk containing n data files in total and a key-
word universe W . A receives ({cj}1≤j≤n, {Ij}1≤j≤k)
such that cj is an encrypted data file and Ij ←
BuildIndex(K,Dj , j). Then A makes a polynomial num-
ber of adaptive queries. For each queried keyword w, A
receives a search token τw ← TokenGen(K,w) from the
challenger. Finally, A returns a bit b that is output by the
experiment.
• IdealA,S(λ): A chooses k collections of data files
D1, ...,Dk containing n data files in total and a keyword
universe W . Given Lsetup({Dj}1≤j≤k,W), S simulates
and sends ({c∗j}1≤j≤n, {I∗j }1≤j≤k) to A. Then A makes
a polynomial number of adaptive queries. For each
queried keyword wi, letw denote the sequence of existing
i queried keywords such that w = {w1, ..., wi}. Given
Lquery(w), S simulates and sends a search token τ∗wi
to A. Finally, A returns a bit b that is output by the
experiment.
We say that Π is (Lsetup,Lquery)-secure against adaptive
chosen-keyword attacks if for all PPT adversary A, there exists
a PPT simulator S such that
|Pr[RealA(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealA,S(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ).
where negl stands for a negligible function.
Data Structures and Tools. In scheme descriptions we
make use of standard data structures including arrays, lists
and dictionaries. We use the notation A[i] to denote the value
stored at location i of array A. A list simply supports “add”
and “delete” operations. A dictionary stores key/value pairs.
We use the notation D[l] to denote the value labeled with
the key l in dictionary D. D[l] returns ⊥ if l is not exist in
D. The dictionary structure is search efficient such that given
a key l, D[l] can be returned in O(1) time. We also make
use of cryptographic primitives including variable-input-length
pseudo-random function (PRF), pseudo-random permutation
(PRP) and symmetric-key encryption (SKE) scheme. The
security definitions of PRF, PRP and SKE are clearly presented
in [14].
IV. OUR MDS-SSE SCHEME
We first introduce the five algorithms as listed in Definition
1. We then use the five algorithms to construct Setup and
Query protocols. In the rest of the paper, let n be the number
of total data files, ni be the number of data files at DSi and k
be the number of data sources. We use W , fid to respectively
denote a keyword universe and an identifier of a data file.
Algorithm 1: KeyGen
Input: λ: A security parameter
Output: K: A secret key
1 Randomly select K from {0, 1}λ
2 Output K
A. Key Generation. The key generation algorithm simply
chooses a random λ-bit string (see Algorithm 1). The key can
be generated by any one of DS or a trusted third party and
shared under any secure key distribution protocols such as [2],
[22]. In this paper, we assume that a secret key is properly
shared among DS and DU.
B. Index Building. Each DS uses BuildIndex algorithm to
build a local index for his/her own data. The local index is
constructed as an array structure. Each line of the array stores
a keyword and a n-bit string indicating which data files contain
the keyword. DS set the i-th (1 ≤ i ≤ n) bit as 1 if the data file
with fid = i contains the keyword. For example, supposing
n = 10, the string 0110000001 means the keyword appears
in file 2,3 and 10. The input L is a list of integers indicating
which bits (among the total n bits) are assigned for a specific
DS. Later, we will discuss how to assign L for each DS.
After obtaining keyword/strings pairs for all keywords in
W , let’s consider how to encrypt them and how to insert
them into the array. Here, we employ two variable-input-length
pseudo-random functions PRF and PRF′ with the following
parameters:
PRF : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ
PRF′ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n
A keyword w is encoded as α = PRF(K, 1||w) where K is the
secret key. Line 11-12 in Algorithm 2 makes the encryption
key for a bit string both keyword-specific and data-source-
specific. Bit string encryption is simply XOR operation. Note
that W is not required to be confidential, namely, W is
assumed to be known to the adversary2. Therefore, DS cannot
insert all the keyword/string pairs into the array in the order
as same as the order in W . To achieve random insertion while
keep a same order among all DS, we employ a pseudo-random
permutation PRP with the following parameters:
PRP : {0, 1}λ × {1, ..., |W|} → {1, ..., |W|}
The secret key for PRP, which we call the shuffle key, is
the output of PRF(K, 1). Thus all DS get the same shuffle
key and insert keyword/string pairs into the array in a same
shuffled order. BuildIndex algorithm is described in detail in
Algorithm 2.
C. Index Merging. Upon receiving k arrays (i.e. local index-
es) from DS, SP merges them using MergeIndex algorithm.
The resultant index is formed as a dictionary structure storing
(encrypted) keyword/string pairs. SP merges k arrays line by
line. For each line, SP needs to merge k keywords and k
bit strings respectively. As k keywords should be same to
each other, SP just selects any one of them as the result of
“merging” (line 5 in Algorithm 3). To merge k bit strings, SP
2This may happen when DS choose a public keyword list as W .
Algorithm 2: BuildIndex
Input: K: A secret key
D: A collection of data files
W : A keyword universe
L: A list of |D| integers
sid: An identity of data source
n: The total number of data files
Output: A: An array of keyword/string pairs
1 Set Kshuffle = PRF(K, 1)
2 Initialize an array A of length |W|.
3 Initialize a counter ctr = 1
4 for w ∈ W do
5 Initialize a counter i = 1
6 Initialize an n-bit zero string γ
7 for f ∈ D do
8 if w ∈ f then
9 Set γ[L[i]] = 1
10 i = i+ 1
11 Set α = PRF(K, 1||w), β = PRF(K, 2||w)
12 Set κsid = PRF′(β, sid)
13 Set γ = γ ⊕ κsid
14 Set A[PRP(Kshuffle, ctr)] =< α, γ >
15 ctr = ctr + 1
16 Output A
Algorithm 3: MergeIndex
Input: {Ai}1≤i≤k: Arrays generated by k data sources
Output: I: A searchable index
1 Initialize an empty dictionary I
2 for i ∈ {1, ..., k} do
3 Parse Ai as < αi,1, γi,1 >, ..., < αi,|W|, γi,|W| >
4 for j ∈ {1, ..., |W|} do
5 Set α = α1,j (note that α1,j = α2,j = ... = αk,j)




7 Set I[α] = γ
8 Output I
computes the XOR results for all strings (line 6 in Algorithm
3). SP then inserts the merged keyword/string pair into the
dictionary and process the next line. Algorithm 3 displays the
details of MergeIndex.
D. Token Generation. DU use the secret key to generate
search tokens for keywords they want to search for. A search
token is a < α, κ > tuple, in which α will be used to locate the
correct entry of the dictionary while κ will be used to decrypt
the corresponding bit string. Algorithm 4 displays the details
of TokenGen.
E. Search. Upon receiving a search token τw =< α, κ >
from a DU, SP searches the index using α and obtains a
encrypted bit string, and then uses κ to decrypt the bit string.
Algorithm 5 displays the details of Search.
F. Setup. During the setup protocol, DS encrypt their data
files and build searchable indexes. SP receives encrypted data
Algorithm 4: TokenGen
Input: K: A secret key
w: A keyword for search
k: The number of data sources
Output: τw: A search token
1 Set α = PRF(K, 1||w), β = PRF(K, 2||w)




3 Output τw =< α, κ >
Algorithm 5: Search
Input: τw: A search token
I: A searchable index
Output: ID(w): A set of identifiers
1 Parse τw as < α, κ >
2 Set γ = I[α]
3 Initialize an empty set ID(w)
4 if γ = ⊥ then
5 Set γ = γ ⊕ κ
6 Scan the n-bit string γ and add fidi in ID(w) if
the bit at position i is 1
7 Output ID(w)
files and indexes from DS and merges all indexes. Firstly,
each DS obtains n as follows: DSi(1 ≤ i ≤ k) encrypts ni
and sends it to SP. SP then sends all encrypted ni to every
DS. Each DS thus can decrypt all ni and add them together to
obtain n. Secondly, DSi needs to know which ni bits in the n-
bit string are assigned for him/her (i.e., the list L in Algorithm
2). To achieve random assignment3, we use another pseudo-
random permutation PRP′ with the following parameters:
PRP′ : {0, 1}λ × {1, ..., n} → {1, ..., n}
to shuffle the sequence (1, ..., n). DS1 selects serial n1 integers
from the shuffled sequence, and DS2 selects serial n2 subse-
quent integers, and so on. Thirdly, DS encrypt all data files
and send them to SP via anonymous communication. Fourthly,
DS build local indexes using algorithm BuildIndex and send
them to SP. Fifthly, SP merges all indexes using algorithm
MergeIndex. The details of Setup are listed in Protocal 1.
ENC and DEC in Protocal 1 are encryption and decryption
algorithms from a secure SKE scheme.
G. Query. During the query protocol, DU issue search
tokens using algorithm TokenGen and then SP returns search
results output by algorithm Search. The details of Query are
listed in Protocal 2.
V. SECURITY
In this section, we analyze the security of our MDS-SSE
scheme. We first define the leakage functions in our scheme
as follows:
3This randomization is not required in our security proof, but to defend
adversaries with additional background knowledge. For example, if we assign
a serial substring for each data source and an adversary has the knowledge
that a data source is most likely to search his/her own data, then the adversary
can observe an intensively touched substring and roughly estimate the number
of data files for this data source.
Protocol 1: Setup
(Assume all DS share a secret key K ←KeyGen(λ))
DSi (1 ≤ i ≤ k):
1 Set n′i = ENC(K,ni)
2 Send n′i to SP
SP:
1 Send (n′1, ..., n′k) to every DS
DSi (1 ≤ i ≤ k):
1 for j ∈ {1, ..., k} do
2 nj = DEC(K,n′j)
3 Set n =
∑n




4 K ′shuffle = PRF(K, 2)
5 Shuffle (1, ..., n) as (a1, ..., an) by computing
aj = PRP′(K ′shuffle, j) for j ∈ {1, ..., n}
6 Initialize an empty list L
7 for j ∈ {n′ + 1, ..., n′ + ni} do
8 Append aj to L
9 for fj ∈ Di(1 ≤ j ≤ ni) do
10 Set fidj = L[j]
11 Let fidj be the identifier of fj
12 cj = ENC(K, fj)
13 Send < fidj, cj > to SP via anonymous
communication
14 Ai ← BuildIndex(K,Di,W , L, i, n)
15 Send Ai to SP
SP:
1 Set I ← MergeIndex({Ai}1≤i≤k)
Protocol 2: Query
DU:
1 Input a search word w
2 τw ←TokenGen(K,w, k)
3 Send τw to SP.
SP:
1 Set ID(w) ← Search(τw, I)
2 Send ID(w) to DU
• Lsetup({Dj}1≤j≤k,W) = (k, n, {|cj|}1≤j≤n,W)
• Lquery(w) = (ϕw, ρw)
where k, n, |cj |,W , ϕw, ρw stands for the number of data col-
lections, the total number of data files, the length of encrypted
file cj , the keyword universe, the access pattern over the query
sequence w and the search pattern over the query sequence w,
respectively.
Theorem 1: If PRF,PRF′,PRP,SKE are secure cryp-
tographic primitives, then our scheme is (Lsetup,Lquery)-
secure against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks (CKA2) in the
standard model.
Proof: In the experiment Real (described in Definition
4), A receives ({cj}1≤j≤n, {Ij}1≤j≤k, {τj}1≤j≤q). In
addition to the typical definition, A also receives
k encrypted integers {n′j}1≤j≤k during the Setup
protocol. We construct a simulator S in the experiment
Ideal (described in Definition 4), who simulates
({n′∗j }1≤j≤k, {c∗j}1≤j≤n, {I∗j }1≤j≤k, {τ∗j }1≤j≤q) using
the output of Lsetup and Lquery . We prove that A
cannot distinguish between experiments Real and
Ideal. In other words, A cannot distinguish between
({n′∗j }1≤j≤k, {c∗j}1≤j≤n, {I∗j }1≤j≤k, {τ∗j }1≤j≤q) and
({n′j}1≤j≤k, {cj}1≤j≤n, {Ij}1≤j≤k, {τj}1≤j≤q). In the
following proof, when we say “indistinguishable” or “cannot
distinguish” we mean the advantage in distinguishing two
variables is limited by negl(λ).
Simulating {n′j}1≤j≤k: S randomly selects a key K∗ of
length λ and k integers n∗1, ..., n∗k. For each integer n∗i (1 ≤
i ≤ k), S sets n′∗i = ENC(K∗, n∗i ). As SKE is secure,
(n′∗1 , ..., n′∗k ) and (n′1, ..., n′k) are indistinguishable to A.
Simulating {c∗j}1≤j≤n: For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, S randomly selects
a bit string c∗j of length |cj |. As SKE is secure, {c∗j}1≤j≤n
and {cj}1≤j≤n are indistinguishable to A.
Simulating {I∗j }1≤j≤k: S initialize k arrays {I∗j }1≤j≤k of
size |W|. S randomly selects |W| bit strings {α∗j}1≤j≤|W| of
length λ and k · |W| bit strings {γ∗c,j}1≤c≤k,1≤j≤|W| of length
n. S sets I∗c [j] =< α∗j , γ∗c,j > for 1 ≤ c ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ |W|.
As PRF is a secure pseudo-random function, {I∗j }1≤j≤k
and {Ij}1≤j≤k are indistinguishable to A.
Simulating {τ∗j }1≤j≤q: S computes I ←
MergeIndex({I∗j }1≤j≤k). For 1 ≤ i ≤ q, according to
ρw
• if the i-th query has never appeared before, then S ran-
domly selects an α∗i from {α∗j}1≤j≤|W| (as the security
of PRP guarantees that each query touches a random
index entry), making sure α∗i has not been selected before.
From ϕw S extracts the search results of the i-th query,
denoted as ID(wi), and generates a bit string γ∗ of
length n, making the j-th bit of γ∗ be 1 if j ∈ ID(wi)





i >• if the i-th query is the same with a prior query, which




In such a way, S simulates correct search tokens which
have the same search results as in the experiment Real. There-
fore, A cannot distinguish between {τ∗j }1≤j≤q and {τj}1≤j≤q .
In summary, A cannot distinguish between the view in the
experiment Real and the view in the experiment Ideal. Thus
we have
|Pr[RealA(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealA,S(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We implemented our scheme and the extended scheme
of [3] (Appendix A) using Python 2.7.3. In this section we
compare the performance of the two schemes in terms of index
size and search time under different dataset settings. All test
programs were performed on an Intel Core i5-4570 3.20GHz










TABLE I. DOCUMENT COLLECTIONS
computer with 8GB RAM running Windows 8.1. Each data
point in the figures is an average of 10 executions.
Dataset. We chose three types of real-world text datasets,
as shown in Table I. The Abstract-* collections were extracted
from PubMed dataset4. Each data file contained an abstract of
a paper. The Email-* collections were extracted from Enron
dataset5. Each data file was an email without attachments. The
Webpage-* collections were extracted from DBLife dataset6.
Each data file was an webpage of a personal homepage. In all
tests, we used a keyword universe of 3000 common English
words. We fixed k as 5. Note that k value does not influence
the index size and the search time for both schemes.
Fig. 2 reports index sizes for nine data collections. From
individual subfigures we can observe that the index size of
both schemes grows linearly to the number of data files. For
our scheme, as the length of bit string equals to the number of
data files, the increase of the length of bit string leads to the
increase of the index size. For [3], the increase of the index
size is due to the increase of the number of keyword/identifier
pairs.
While comparing the three subfigures 2(a)-2(c), we can
see that the index size of [3] is sensitive to the total number
of words. The more words in the collection, the more key-
word/indentifier pairs need to be indexed. Such a case will
happen until the collection has included all keywords in the
keyword universe. By contrast, the index size of our scheme
remains stable in three types of data collections, because its
index size is only decided by the size of keyword universe and
the number of data files.
In all 9 collections, index sizes of our scheme are smaller
than that of [3]. Therefore our scheme is storage efficient and
well-suited to applications where data files are large.
For both schemes, the search time cost is from three kinds
of operations, namely, dictionary search, result decryption and
result extraction. The actual number of operations needed is
decided by the number of data files and/or the number of search
results. Thus we tested two schemes’ search performance by
respectively varying the above two parameters.
In the first test (Fig. 3), we fixed the number of data files as
1000. Different queried keywords result in different numbers
of search results, so we report the search time of four specific
keywords with 50, 100, 150, 200 results respectively. From
any of subfigures 3(a)-3(c) we can see that the search time of
both schemes increases when more and more search results are





























































































































































































Fig. 4. Search time evaluation: Varying # of data files.
result extractions, but brings no change in dictionary search
and result decryption. Moreover, the result extraction in our
scheme is merely to scan a bit string and find all positions
where the bit is 1. Such operations are extremely efficient so
that the increase in search time is slight. But for [3], more
search results means more dictionary searches, more result
decryptions and more result extractions. That’s why the search
time of [3] is much more sensitive to the number of results
than that of our scheme.
In the second test (Fig. 4), we kept the number of search
results accounting for 10% of the entire collection rather than
a fixed number, because in practice a specific query usually
associates a fixed percentage of data files. From subfigures
4(a)-4(c) we can observe how the increasing number of data
files affects the search time. For our scheme, the search time
increases because result decryption spends more time on a
longer bit string. Result extraction also requires a little more
time on string scanning but such time can be ignored. For [3],
more results will be returned when the number of data files
grows, which results in more time needed in a search.
While comparing between subfigures 3(a)-3(c), 4(a)-4(c),
we can see there is no significant change in the search time for
both schemes when the number of words increases. Though the
index size of [3] increases when more words are included, the
usage of dictionary structure guarantees a stable search time.
From the results we can see that the search time of our scheme
is much smaller than that of [3].
VII. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the practical phenomenon in data outsourcing
scenarios that user data is often separately distributed, we
propose a novel MDS-SSE scheme. The work of [3] is the only
existing work that imports no additional information leakage
in the multiple data source setting after proper modification.
Our scheme outperforms the scheme in [3] in two aspects.
Firstly, their scheme has to maintain an online table while
ours has no such requirement. Secondly, our scheme has better
performance in terms of index size and search time under
different kinds of data collections.
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APPENDIX A
EXTENSION OF THE SCHEME IN [3]
We show how to properly extend the basic scheme in [3]
to fit the MDS-SSE setting. A compact description is listed in
Scheme 1. To prevent conflicts in using counters7 among data
sources, the scheme has to import an online table (denoted as T
in Scheme 1) during index building. The online table associates
an counter initialized as 0 for all keywords in W (as illustrated
in Fig. 5(a)). Every time a DSi processes a keyword, DSi
retrieves the current counter of this keyword from the online
table, and then updates it by adding |IDi(w)|. The retrieved
counter will be the initial counter for this keyword at DSi’s
side (which is always 0 in the original scheme). The illustrative
tables shown in Fig. 5(b) and Fig. 5(c) are updated by two DS












(c) After second updat-
ing
Fig. 5. Online table: an illustration.
Scheme 1: Extension of the scheme in [3]
Setup (by DSi and SP)
DSi (1 ≤ i ≤ k):
1 Share a secret key K ∈ {0, 1}λ with other DS
2 Initialize an empty list Li
3 for w ∈ W do
(Let F be a PRF.)
4 K1 = F (K, 1||w), K2 = F (K, 2||w)
5 Retrieve the current counter c of w in T
6 Update c to c+ |IDi(w)| in T
7 for fid ∈ IDi(w) do
8 l = F (K1, c), d = ENC(K2, f id), c = c+ 1
9 Add < l, d > into Li
10 for f ∈ Di do
f = ENC(K, f)
11 Send Di to SP via anonymous communication
12 Slice Li into fragments of equal size and send each
fragment to SP via anonymous communication
SP:
1 Initialize an empty dictionary I
2 Insert keyword/identifier pairs in each fragment into I
Query (by DU and SP)
DU:
1 Input a search word w
2 K1 = F (K, 1||w), K2 = F (K, 2||w)
3 Send (K1,K2) to SP
SP:
1 for c = 0 until d = ⊥ do
2 d = I[F (K1, c)], fid = DEC(K2, d), c = c+ 1
3 Send each fid to DU
7In [3], each keyword/identifier pair is assigned an integer counter number.
